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What is higher education praxis in a world beset by crises? Sjølie et al. (2020) explore 
this in relation to academics’ learning during the Covid-19 pandemic, using the 
theory of practice architectures, to highlight key responses and adaptations to the 
Coronavirus pandemic. I offer a re-reading of their cases of changing practice, 
challenging a sense of being accepting of, resigned to, and unfolding ‘under’ given 
circumstances. Instead, I highlight agentic, transformative praxis, where people act 
individually and collectively towards alternative futures. Drawing on Stetsenko’s 
transformative activist stance, I point to ways the theory of practice architectures 
might be put to work ‘dangerously’, as part of a struggle for a better world. 
Envisioning a reinvigoration of a politically charged theory of practice architectures, 
I argue that it offers particular value through the concept of learning as coming to 
practise differently, sharpened through a notion of contribution rather than 
participation.  
 




Received 20 January 2021; revised version received 3 May 20201; accepted 18 June 







When confronted with crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, it is important to 
consider how our practices change in light of new circumstances and conditions. 
This is what Sjølie et. al (2020) offer with respect to the learning of academics as 
the pandemic unfolded. In this paper I offer a re-reading of their account, arguing 
that there is a need to shift the frame from response and adaptation to learning, 
agency and contribution: the praxis of higher education should explicitly adopt a 
more committed and transformative orientation. This can be traced in Sjølie et al.’s 
cases and the theoretical framework they apply. Agency and contribution are 









consistent with the theory of practice architectures (TPA), capturing aspects of its 
transformative spirit that risk being downplayed through a focus on response and 
adaptation.  
I draw on Stetsenko’s (2017, 2020b) transformative activist stance (TAS) 
in order to tease out an alternative reading of Sjølie et al.’s paper, one where 
struggle towards the future is more prominent, rather than adaptation to given 
(albeit extraordinary, in the context of the global pandemic) circumstances. My 
argument is not that TPA and TAS should be merged, nor is my purpose to compare 
and contrast the theory. My intention is to bring into relief features and potential 
inherent in TPA by taking up cues from Stetsenko’s work. Specifically, the overt 
political ethic-political commitments in TAS can be mobilised to strengthen 
collective and committed aspects of TPA, guard against TPA being taken up in 
banal ways, and help to make the theory of practice architectures ‘dangerous again, 
that is, useful in the struggle for a better world’ (Stetsenko, 2020c, p. 7).  
Sjølie et al. (2020) explore how they, as academics ‘have come to practise 
differently under the abrupt changes caused by responses to the Coronavirus 
pandemic’ (p. 85). They present cases from Norway, Finland, Sweden and 
Australia, outlining how the pandemic affected their institutions and professional 
practices, reflecting on their learning in this process. The cases focus on shifts to 
working from home and online teaching, and the huge disruptions, constraints and 
demands that were confronted. This points to the significant accomplishment of 
keeping going. That academic practices were possible or more precisely, made 
possible, should not be taken for granted, given that many people within and beyond 
higher education found themselves excluded from the possibility of practising, as 
institutions shut down, workers were furloughed, and jobs were lost. We must 




Learning in the theory of practice architectures 
 
Learning is framed by Sjølie et al. (2020) as a matter of coming to practise 
differently (Kemmis, 2019b, 2021). This reflects recent developments in the theory 
of practice architectures, refining notions of learning articulated earlier within this 
perspective. Learning had been discussed previously as being stirred into practices 
(Kemmis et al., 2014, 2017; Mahon, Francisco, & Lloyd, 2017). Later, Kemmis 
remarked:  
 
I now think the notion of coming to know how to go on in 
a practice encompasses and improves upon the notions of 









being initiated into practices and being stirred into 
practices. It is more inclusive, and allows for the case where 
B, the learner, is learning alone, without an A to do the 
showing or teaching or initiating or stirring. (Kemmis, 
2019a, p. 123 [emphasis in original]). 
 
This revision signals a subtle shift in direction that is taken further in the concept 
of learning as coming to practise differently. The shift is towards a more active role 
and a more central focus on difference. Being stirred in can be read as passive, 
pointing to questions as to whom or what is doing the stirring. The idea of coming 
to know how to go on points to an idea of change—at least for the person coming 
to know. This resonates with what Hager (2011) describes as a third tranche of 
theories of workplace learning that go beyond metaphors of acquisition and 
participation to focus instead on emergence and becoming. There is a clear sense of 
becoming (different) in Kemmis’ (2019a) clarification. 
Sjølie et al. (2020) deploy a subsequent revision that takes this shift further. 
Coming to practise differently suggest there is both a ‘becoming’ for the learner, 
and that the practice itself may be changing (Kemmis, 2021). The distinct 
possibility that the person might contribute to changes in practice is raised, going 
beyond learning as a question of changing one’s actions in order to fit or ‘go on’ 
appropriately in an existing practice. This speaks to a shift in the focus among 
practice theorists from relationality to social change (see Schatzki, 2019)—
questions of practice are increasingly being mobilised to understand not how the 
world is, but how it comes to be. It is here where the concept of learning within 
TPA is brought into closer alignment with its longstanding critical and 
emancipatory tenor. This opens up opportunities to reinvigorate TPA, to put it to 
work more ‘dangerously’, moving us towards alternative, preferable futures. 
The revised concept of learning reflects more precisely and explicitly 
something that has always been there in TPA. Referring to Aristotelian notions of 
dispositions, Kemmis and Grootenboer (2008) foregrounded not only being 
informed, technically skilful and acting rightly (the dispositions of epistēmē, technē 
and phronēsis), but also a critical disposition to overcome injustice and suffering. 
Practices are projective in their nature, moving towards something. That something 
is not given, it must be taken, and taken up. From its onset, the TPA has explicitly 
pointed to a sense of practices changing, and of people having a responsibility in 
that regard. The revised concept brings learning into better alignment with aspects 
that retain not just the possibility of practice change, but a responsibility in this 
regard. This interpretation is further supported by Kemmis’ definition of practice, 
referred to in Sjølie et al.’s (2020) paper: 
 









A form of human action in history, in which particular 
activities (doings) are comprehensible in terms of particular 
ideas and talk (sayings), and when the people involved are 
distributed in particular kinds of relationships (relatings), 
and when this combination of sayings, doings and relatings 
‘hangs together’ in the project of the practice (the ends and 
purposes that motivate the practice). (Kemmis, 2019a, p. 
13) 
 
The TPA treats learning as situated in particular sites, shaped by historical 
conditions which shape the what, how and why of people’s practices (Sjølie et al., 
2020). The TPA conceptualises this shaping dialectically. Practices are held in 
place by combinations of arrangements that form practice architectures—cultural-
discursive, material-economic and social-political. Practices comprise sayings, 
doings and relatings that uphold, shape and potentially reshape the architectures 
that shape them (Kemmis et al., 2014). In this position, Kemmis joins other practice 
theorists such as Schatzki (2002, 2010, 2019) in conceptualising practices as both 
prefigured and emergent—shaped but not determined, ever open to the possibility 
of change (see Hopwood, 2016; Kemmis & Grootenboer, 2008). 
 
 
Response and adaptation 
 
Sjølie et al.’s (2020) list of what they learned to differently is characterised by 
adaptation and response. This undoubtedly reflects, accurately, the unprecedented 
and unavoidable disruptions and restrictions caused by the pandemic. The pandemic 
was such a profound shock to our lives and practices that a sense of adaptation is so 
strong, especially given that the piece was written while these adaptations were still 
being figured out. As a series of first-person narratives, the paper reflects the unique 
access each author had to the events in their own working and family lives, allowing 
them to acknowledge feelings of strangeness, longing, guilt, and so on. The feelings 
that the changes in practice reflected a forced accommodation of an unwelcome, 
indeed deeply worrying, intrusion, are indeed ones I recognise myself from that time. 
Sjølie et al.’s (2020) account focuses on accommodating what was no longer 
possible, using unfamiliar tools in order to act amid novel constraints: adapting to 
online meetings when face-to-face was not possible, using breakout rooms in Zoom 
instead of small groups in a classroom, recruiting research participants through phone 
or zoom instead of in person, working from (shared) home spaces when the office 
was closed. The framing is one of lost possibility, being ‘pushed into’ online teaching 









(p. 89), ‘forced to think’ (p. 90) in different ways, or ‘comply’ with required changes 
(p. 99), being ‘obliged to adapt our practices’ (p. 101).  
The pandemic represented an extraordinary disruption to, imposition on, and 
threat to higher education practices, indeed to human life. Such responses, ways of 
making do, and finding our way were crucial in enabling us to carry on and maintain 
things that mattered. My argument is that learning and agency during the pandemic 
involved more than being compelled to act differently under given circumstances: 
there were instances where stands were taken, and commitments made. This may 
often have been entangled with adaptive changes, but I suggest TPA becomes most 
valuable to us when we use it to discern—even if only in glimpses and suggestions—
praxis, critique and envisioning of futures that are not defined purely by coping with 
the pandemic but reflect other political and ethical commitments. 
A conservative and preservative feel extends into the way Sjølie et al. (2020) 
engage the theory of practice architectures. Referring to learning to work from home, 
they note ‘[t]he practice architectures that provided conditions of possibility for 
academic work in the office were replaced by practice architectures designed to 
support the practices of home life’ (p. 97). This is an important insight. When 
working from home we do not simply carry a laptop and continue—the practice 
unfolds amid different architectures that hold different things in place, or hold similar 
things in place differently. The sense of response and adaptation is clear here when 
the analysis refers to academic practices being practised differently ‘to fit around 
home schooling and family management practices’ (p. 97, emphasis added). This 
language of response, adaptation, obligation, risks us failing to notice more agentic, 
committed and contributive aspects of learning and praxis. Towards the end of the 
paper, the authors note: 
 
The academics in the case stories did their best to learn to 
practise differently under the new circumstances of the time 
of the Coronavirus, and they did their best to resituate their 
practices so they could be sustained in new sites in ways that 
do not diminish the meaningful in academic work.  (Sjølie et 
al., 2020, p. 97, emphases in original) 
 
Key here is the phrase ‘under the new circumstances’. This conveys circumstances 
as a given, something immutable, immovable and incontestable. New laws or 
institutional directives indeed curtailed or prohibited practices. However, the theory 
of practice architectures has, from the outset, recognised the importance of 
circumstances in shaping practices while simultaneously holding that these are open 
and themselves subject to being shaped by people enacting practices. In the next 
section, I outline Stetsenko’s (2017, 2020a-d) transformative activist stance as a 









prelude to a different reading of Sjølie et al.’s account, one that draws out this more 
agentic side, building an argument that the story of learning is much less responsive 
and adaptive than Sjølie et al. (2020) themselves suggest. 
 
 
A transformative activist stance 
 
Stetsenko’s transformative activist stance (TAS) connects ontology, epistemology 
and praxis, foregrounding agency in a theory of mind, personhood, development 
and learning that is resolutely non-dualist, deeply dialectical, and flagrantly partisan 
(see Stetsenko, 2008, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2020a-d). TAS builds closely on Vygotsky, 
critical pedagogy (Freire), Bakhtin’s dialogism, feminism and the philosophy of 
practice (Stetsenko, 2020a). Stetsenko (2016) notes that TAS’ connection between 
theory, research and philosophy resonates with praxis-related research and the 
philosophy of practice, citing Kemmis (2010). She writes: ‘At stake in such 
approaches … is the recovery of practical philosophy which moves the primary 
locus of ethical-philosophical debates into practical contexts’ (2016, pp. s34-s35). 
This is precisely the aspect that I take up in the re-reading of Sjølie et al.’s paper 
and take up as a basis to call for a reinvigoration of TPA, building on a recent 
conceptualization of learning: a focus not just on change, but on a morally and 
politically charged process of things coming to be done differently. The following 
paragraphs elaborate these most relevant features of TAS. 
TAS echoes the work Vygotsky and his colleagues in its alignment with a 
Marxist ethos of building a society in solidarity with others (Stetsenko, 2020b, 
2020c). This holds that people attain freedom in and through the self-realisation of 
others, where this self-realisation is carried out in solidarity and coordination with 
that of others and is itself a path towards the self-realisation of others. TAS is 
committed to directing social resources for the benefit of everyone, particularly 
those marginalised and oppressed, especially through education and also in other 
venues including union organising. This is important in distinguishing TAS from 
approaches that focus on participation in practices:  
 
Most critically, what is suggested by the transformative 
approach is yet another shift—a transition from 
participation (as derived from the notion of dwelling in the 
present and adapting to it) to contribution—a more active 
and activist stance implying that all acts of being, knowing, 
and doing take place at the sites of ideological struggles and 
are part and parcel of such struggles. (Stetsenko, 2017, p. 
11, emphasis added) 










The distinction between participation and contribution can help us sharpen 
the notion of learning in TPA. Kemmis’ (2019b, 2021) recent revisions, foreground 
learning as coming to practise differently, already open up more explicitly a notion 
that learning might result in more than doing what others already do, and instead 
contribute to difference and change. The idea of contribution suggests that we need 
to ask not just what differences are manifest, but where those differences take us, 
what responsibilities they enact, what commitments they advance, what futures they 
realise. 
The following expression, which captures the heart of TAS, its 
transformative ethico-ontoepistemology: 
 
It is directly through and in the process, and moreover, 
precisely as the process of people constantly transforming 
and co-creating their social world and thus moving beyond 
the status quo (rather than as an addition to it) that people 
simultaneously create and constantly transform their very 
life, there- fore also changing themselves in fundamental 
ways while, also in and as this very process, becoming 
individually unique and gaining knowledge about 
themselves and the world. (Stetsenko, 2020a, pp. 11–12, 
emphasis in original) 
 
Such formulations help us recognise ways to take up TPA in more 
politically engaged, future-oriented ways. Kemmis (2019a) emphasises the 
projects, ends and (moral) purposes of practices. When we consider learning as 
coming to practise differently, these ends and purposes do not disappear: the 
difference does not emerge in a political and moral vacuum. At issue is not just 
participation, but contribution, including the determination of direction—towards 
what are we contributing? Stetsenko is again helpful here, explaining how the 
horizons of the future ‘are not somehow delivered by any authority somewhere 
from high up, but instead have to be figured out by individuals and communities 
themselves’ (Stetsenko, 2020b, p. 734).  
Also important in TAS is the emphasis on struggle and striving. Stetsenko 
explains ‘the primary emphasis is on struggle and striving—on people en-
countering, con-fronting, and overcoming the circumstances and conditions that are 
not so much given as taken up by people’ (2020a, p. 12, emphasis in original). 
Stetsenko (2020b) critiques the frequent posthuman retreat into political quietism 
and accommodation of the status quo, advocating more radical approaches that 
‘reclaim human agency at the intersection of individual and collective planes, 









within a dialectically unified human praxis’ (p. 735). This reclaiming is not just a 
matter of theoretical nuance, but a fundamental shift, which Stetsenko argues… 
 
… needs to be supported by scholarship that is explicitly 
activist and ready to take sides in the ongoing battles for the 
future while doing the work of imagining this future and 
committing to it, including through theorizing activism and 
conceptualizing agency at the intersection of individual and 
social dimensions. (Stetsenko, 2020d, p. 3) 
 
The issue of handling the individual and social without losing either or collapsing 
one onto the other is crucial in understanding the significance of Kemmis’ (2021) 
notion of learning within the TPA. Kemmis, like Stetsenko, draws on dialectic 
thinking to accomplish this. A brief consideration of these features strengthens a 
view that coming to practise differently is both an individual and a social affair, and 
by virtue of its social implication, a non-neutral one.  
Kemmis (2019a) explains how the TPA embraces both an Aristotelian 
tradition of praxis (focused on morally informed, committed action), and a 
Hegelian-Marxian tradition of praxis as history-making, as action oriented towards 
changing society. Kemmis (2019a) draws on Marx’s third Thesis on Feuerbach, to 
specify dynamic dialectical relationships of mutual constitution between 
‘individual’ sayings, doings and relatings, and ‘social’ arrangements:  
 
Marx nevertheless felt that Feuerbach’s materialism 
remained incomplete: it omitted the role of people in 
making history. In the third Thesis, Marx thus draws 
attention not only to the notion that people are shaped by 
circumstances and upbringing (and that, therefore, changed 
people would be the products of changed circumstances and 
changed upbringing), but also to the role of people in this 
history: it is people who change circumstances, and people 
who educate educators (‘upbringers’). (Kemmis, 2019a, p. 
28, emphasis in original) 
 
 
Commitment and agency in academics’ learning in the pandemic  
 
I will now highlight features of learning described by Sjølie et al. (2020) that 
counter the sense of adaptation under given circumstances. I suggest that the 
authors’ story is more than one of response, it is one of contribution to change, 









novelty, solidarity and a re-imagining of the university, its values and its value. 
There are examples in their cases of agentic, committed action that challenge the 
givenness of the status quo, working towards sought-after futures—therefore 
reflecting features of Stetsenko’s transformative activist stance.  
 
Sjølie et al. (2020) conclude that their learning in the time 
of the Coronavirus helped to … renew the communitarian 
character of academic life in the contexts in which we work. 
In learning to practise academic life and work differently, 
resituating our practices to work from home and virtually, 
we also recovered what we most value in academic life and 
work: its intrinsically communitarian character. (Sjølie et 
al., 2020, p. 104) 
 
We can see this clearly in the account from Norway, which highlights the 
importance of dugnasdånd in responses to the pandemic. Dugnasdånd, roughly 
translated as ‘the spirit of willingness to work together for a better community’ (p. 
90), captures an idea of an individual contribution to a collective effort and the fact 
that this effort is about moving towards some kind of a desired, different state of 
affairs. The tenor here is not resigned acceptance of the status quo, of learning to 
deal with given circumstances, of practising ‘under’ conditions. It is rather about a 
collective—or even collectividual (Stetsenko, 2013) striving for and movement 
towards something different and better. In the language of the theory of practice 
architectures, dugnasdånd can be seen as an expression in language of a cultural 
tradition, a project that seeks to reshape practice architectures towards particular 
ends, guided by communitarian spirit. This is concretely manifest in the changes 
made to practises in order to engage participants in collaborative meetings and 
adopting new structures that clarified collective agreements and achievements. 
Adaptation alone would have ‘finished’ with the replacement of a physical meeting 
with a digital platform. However, a communitarian stance was taken, valuing 
engagement and processes of collectively determining what to do next. Changes 
resulting from ‘forced adaptation’ to the pandemic were also changes that 
contributed to the future. 
In the Finnish case, we find the restrictions of the pandemic becoming a 
basis for different relationships between the author and young refugee research 
participants. This is not merely adaptive, but a change that is (also) shaped by a 
solidarity with others, a recognition of one’s privileged position, and a 
determination to continue in work that is valuable for its potential benefits to others. 
The project being launched in adapted format was not the end of the matter, but 
rather the start of something: ‘yet-to-come changes [that] might fundamentally 









change my understanding of the focus and my positionality in this study’ (p. 91). 
The Finnish case also points to something similar in the idea of talkoot, which refers 
to unpaid, often semi-mandatory work for the common good. This recognises that 
individual worker’s struggles were part of ‘an even greater struggle that the 
declining economy will cause’ (p. 93). This manifest concretely in actions of letting 
go in order to focus on what mattered collectively, and a push towards more 
environmentally sustainable practices for the post-pandemic era. Again we see a 
collectividual motif even if the term itself is not used, and a sense not of acceptance, 
not even of resistance, but of striving towards alternative futures, through (I argue, 
agentic) actions in which individuals act in solidarity, in common striving, with 
others. 
In the Swedish case contribution, agency and transcending the status quo 
are evident in the description of the academic supervisor initiating online fika 
meetings. Fika is a Swedish practice of taking a coffee break with others (and with 
sweet snacks), typically recognised as more a matter of socialising than caffeine 
intake. This might seem like a simple transfer of a practice from in-person to an 
online format, an act of preservation rather than contribution. With all the pressures 
and new demands, the ‘given’ could have been to let go of fika, but this was not 
done. Keeping it going took a stance that valued social connection. Coming to 
practise fika differently involved taking it up as a site to ‘check in’ on colleagues in 
ways that would have been done through other practices prior to the pandemic. 
Practising fika changed from its given in-person routine to light relief from the 
gravity of the pandemic; to a means of connection at a time of profound 
disconnection.  This was more than an adaptation, a shift in platform. The online, 
and then hybrid, versions of fika were not just the same practice enacted via a 
different platform. The way of doing fika changed (logging on rather than turning 
up), but fika itself changed. Those involved contributed to something, new, based 
on their valuing connection with one another. 
In the Australian case there are other signs of stance-taking, commitment, 
and emergence, not just accommodation and acceptance. The provision of support 
to children, investing time and emotional energy that might otherwise have been 
devoted to work was framed as a decision, indicating that the author took a stance, 
made a values-based choice, including envisioned futures for her children, and 
acted on it. The development of novel possibilities is evident in reflections on how, 
when other activities were curtailed during lockdown, new practices of gardening 
led to insights informing writing and teaching that ‘may not have emerged 
otherwise’ (p. 96).  
Thus, I argue that the authors did not only use substantive, technical and 
moral dispositions as a compass for their learning. We find more than glimpses of 
praxis guided by critical and emancipatory dispositions, agentic actions that went 









beyond the status quo and towards sought-after futures. This is entirely consistent 
with the framing proposed by Kemmis and Grootenboer (2008), and brings us 
closer to Stetsenko’s (2017, 2020a, 2020b) transformative activist stance. Sjølie et 
al.’s (2020) remark that the cases they share suggest that their learning in the 
pandemic helped to renew the communitarian character of academic life is 
significant. I argue that this formulation downplays the significance of their 
learning. This did not just recover something but involved a collectividual 
commitment to the future that transcended the disruptions, demands and constraints 
of the Coronavirus. The authors refer to ‘holding on to what is most important in 
our work as academics—doing meaningful, productive, praxis-oriented word’ (p. 
101). Arguably their stories are not just of holding on to what was already present, 
but of committing to the future and contributing to change. When they conclude 
that their sense of self has been strengthened in this process, they are in concert 
with Stetsenko’s (2020c) argument that it is in the very process of acting to change 





I have highlighted ways in which the analysis Sjølie et al. (2020) present of 
academics’ learning in the early months of the Coronavirus pandemic points to 
agentic, committed and future-making qualities. This supersedes—carrying forward 
but also adding to—aspects that focus on response and adaptation ‘under’ given 
circumstances. The intrusions of the pandemic in working and everyday lives can be 
accounted for while simultaneously examining how higher education praxis need not 
be confined to accepting the status quo, but can also involve challenging it, taking 
steps towards alternative futures. 
Such a view is entirely consistent with the theory of practice architectures. It 
critically extends the direction that Kemmis (e.g., 2019a, 2019b, 2021) has signalled 
in revisions to the way learning is conceptualised within TPA, uplifting the critical 
and emancipatory disposition that is key to TPA (Kemmis & Grootenboer, 2008; see 
also Hopwood, 2017). I argue we need to make the TPA dangerous (again), and to 
do so we need analyses that foreground learning in connection with commitment, 
practices that realise the future that ought to be. 
The TPA is less a theory of how practices are, and more a theory of how they 
come to be, and how they could be. It challenges an approach to practice change that 
focuses on fixing deficiencies in individuals, and instead points to the need to address 
cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements—without 
notions of individual and collective responsibility being lost. Kemmis’ longstanding 
commitment to action research (e.g., Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005), and critical 









stance (Carr & Kemmis, 1986) help to contextualise the TPA in this way. TAS 
(Stetsenko, 2017) can prompt those working with TPA to think about coming to 
practise differently in terms of action in solidarity with others, towards sought-after 
futures.  
Recent revisions to the concept of learning within TPA provide a foundation 
for doing this. A shift from being stirred into practices, to learning how to go on, to 
coming to practise differently (Kemmis, 2021) heralds a more explicit focus on the 
importance of learning in both individual and social change. Stetsenko’s TAS points 
to ways we might take this idea up with analytical sharpness, cuing us to matters of 
contribution rather than participation. When concerned with contribution, we must 
confront questions about the projects, ends and moral purposes of practices, and the 
bearing that coming to practise differently has upon those.  
Through TPA we can hold both individuals and wider arrangements in play 
without resorting to false dichotomies. Kemmis and Grootenboer (2008) wrote of a 
‘critical disposition to overcome irrationality, injustice and suffering through critical 
reflection and emancipatory action in concert with others’ (p. 39). There is a subtle 
but important distinction between being critical of the status quo or the circumstances 
‘under’ which one acts, and taking a committed stand that refuses to accept the 
givenness of the status quo or the futures to which it points. Herein lies a further way 
in which TAS might provide inspiration for a reinvigorated (dangerous) TPA. TAS 
demands a resolute partisanship, in the sense of a commitment to recognising the 
major crises that affect higher education (or any other aspect of society), recognise 
the socio-political upheavals of our times, without accepting them as faits accomplis. 
Kemmis wrote this poem: 
 
Since Marx, we have known that you and I make history 
but not under circumstances of our own choosing. (Kemmis, 
2019a, p. 99) 
 
While we may not choose these circumstances, embedded as we are in history, we 
need not be resigned to them either: circumstances are of our collective, contributory 
making (Stetsenko, 2017). Sjølie et al. (2020) indeed point to this, at precisely a 
moment when circumstances seem so beyond our control: 
 
That the unthinkable so quickly became realities in the 
corona pandemic, highlights not only how responsive, 
resourceful, and proactive academics can be, but also that 
university practice architectures, which appear to be 
unchangeable and inevitable, may be more malleable than 
we think. This is a source of hope for those deeply concerned 









about the present state of affairs in higher education and 
striving to change prevailing conditions.  (Sjølie et al., 2020, 
p. 103) 
 
Coming to practise differently could involve changes that are wholly adaptive 
and responsive, accepting of the status quo, adjusting to what is (apparently) given. I 
argue that the longstanding critical and emancipatory spirt of the TPA require us to 
sharpen this notion by explicitly connecting it with commitment, moral responsibility 
and transformation (all things that are not new to the TPA). Stetsenko’s notion of 
contribution rather than participation offers a helpful way to do this. If we connect 
coming to practise differently with a sense of contribution, then we can grasp learning 
in politically and ethically charged ways, invoking agency as individuals matter in 
their contribution to something larger. Through its notion of cultural-discursive, 
material-economic and social-political arrangements, the TPA provides a basis to 
understanding how such contributions become possible. Individuals do not contribute 
in a vacuum, but rather do so by taking up the resources (tools, in Stetsenko’s 
language) that are made available to them.  
In this we find a distinctive agenda for praxis in higher education. Realising 
the transformative potential of working with the theory of practice architectures, 
requires a resolutely committed and partisan stance, deploying the theory of practice 
architectures to probe the development and emergence of means through which 
people are able, in solidarity with others, to go beyond adaptation and response, reject 
quiet acceptance and acquiescence, and move instead towards agency, contribution 
and transformation. This agenda lives up to the spirit of the theory of practice 
architectures and resonates with Sjølie et al.’s (2020) commitments to communitarian 
values and aspirations in higher education. 
Taking cues from Stetsenko’s transformative activist stance can help to fold 
the theory of practice architectures into movements of resistance in the face of varied 
crises of late capitalism, and guard against the risk that the theory falls into a ‘banal, 
biscuit-box’ version, and instead be made ‘dangerous again, that is, useful in the 
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